Impact of Unexpected Events, Shocking News and Rumours on Foreign
  Exchange Market Dynamics by McDonald, Mark et al.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
60
71
78
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
0 J
ul 
20
06
Impact of Unexpected Events, Shocking News and Rumours
on Foreign Exchange Market Dynamics
Mark McDonald1, Omer Suleman2, Stacy Williams3, Sam Howison1 and Neil F. Johnson2
1Mathematics Department, Oxford University, Oxford, OX1 2EL, U.K.
2Physics Department, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 3PU, U.K.
3FX Research and Trading Group, HSBC Bank, 8 Canada Square, London E14 5HQ, U.K.
(Dated: April 9, 2018)
We analyze the dynamical response of the world’s financial community to various types of unex-
pected events, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks as they unfolded on a minute-by-minute basis.
We find that there are various ‘species’ of news, characterized by how quickly the news gets ab-
sorbed, how much meaning and importance is assigned to it by the community, and what subsequent
actions are then taken. For example, the response to the unfolding events of 9/11 shows a gradual
collective understanding of what was happening, rather than an immediate realization. For news
items which are not simple economic statements, and hence whose implications are not immediately
obvious, we uncover periods of collective discovery during which collective opinions seem to oscillate
in a remarkably synchronized way. In the case of a rumour, our findings also provide a concrete
example of contagion in inter-connected communities. Practical applications of this work include the
possibility of producing selective newsfeeds for specific communities, based on their likely impact.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
Governments and planning agencies often second-guess
people’s collective response to important pieces of news
and rumours – for example, stories concerning terrorist
attacks, security risks, health scares and economic upsets.
Timing and content are everything, hence the often-cited
claim that governments tend to bury bad news on a bad
news day [1].
In a commercial setting, the fact that the amount of
information available on the web is becoming overwhelm-
ing implies that there are significant opportunities for any
content provider who can provide a customized stream of
important news items. Of course, the notion of ‘impor-
tance’ is somewhat personal – it depends on how surpris-
ing you find such a piece of news, and how relevant it
seems to your affairs.
From a physics perspective, any piece of news repre-
sents a perturbation to the many-body financial system,
which itself comprises a complex global web of financial
traders. The typical approach of a condensed matter
physicist attempting to understand the properties of such
a collective or ‘complex’ many-body system, is to mea-
sure the system’s response to such a perturbation in or-
der to build up a picture of how the system is wired.
In other words, a good way of understanding what is in
such a closed box is to shake it. But can such an ap-
proach work for human-based Complex Systems? This
paper attempts to take a first step along this path, by
monitoring the responses of the global foreign exchange
(FX) market to a variety of perturbations.
Financial markets are continually being ‘kicked’ by
news and events. Recent research suggests that most
everyday news items have relatively little effect on mar-
ket movements [2]. But what about major news? Unlike
most physical systems such as a gas of electrons, indi-
vidual humans may not all respond to external shocks in
the same way. Worse still, even if a given piece of news
is announced globally at a given moment, it will tend
to reach different people at different times. Furthermore
their response times will tend to differ, as will the extent
to which they believe the news to be true. As if this
wasn’t complicated enough, the way in which people re-
spond will also differ in general. What is good news for
one person or market, may be bad for another – or just
plain irrelevant. One might therefore wonder if any kind
of systematic, coordinated, or synchronized response will
ever be observed. This paper shows that indeed it can,
but that the type of response depends strongly on the
‘species’ of news.
The September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. were
unambiguously bad in terms of human lives and world
affairs. But how is such news to be interpreted from
the point of view of a trader dealing with a particular
currency? If it is bad for the U.S. Dollar, is it therefore
good for the Yen? After all, to sell a currency in the
foreign exchange (FX) markets, you need to buy another
one – which is why it is called an exchange-rate. But in a
moment of supposed global crisis, there is presumably no
unambiguously safe currency to buy. So how should the
unfolding of such news affect traders’ decisions to buy or
sell? Do they sell U.S. dollars and buy Japanese Yen, or
vice versa – or maybe do something entirely different? Or
is there instead some more gradual process of collective
learning – a sort of collective realization or discovery of
the meaning and implications of such news?
This paper attempts to address these issues using clus-
tering methods [3] as explained in Sec. II. In Sec. III we
describe the datasets themselves, before moving in Sec.
IV to an analysis of the responses to the news. We find
2that similar results are seen for similar species of news.
We focus on the following four case-studies:
(1) The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the
U.S.;
(2) A false rumour that the Chinese currency (CNY) was
about to be revalued (11 May 2005);
(3) The real CNY revaluation (21 July 2005);
(4) A particular piece of economic news in the form of
an announced government statistic which turned out to
be significantly different from that expected.
In Section V we establish that these results are robust
to the choice of particular clustering method. Section VI
presents a more speculative discussion of the meaning of
news, and the implications of our findings for the classi-
fication of news into ‘species’. Section VII provides the
concluding summary.
II. CLUSTER ANALYSIS
Given that we measure the dynamical response using
cluster analysis of exchange-rate correlations, it is impor-
tant to establish exactly what we mean by such cluster
analysis. This is the discussion that we now undertake
in this section.
Cluster analysis is a field of statistics which attempts to
classify objects into groups. When performing a cluster
analysis, one must first choose a measure of the proxim-
ity between different objects, the dissimilarity measure,
and then specify an algorithm which groups objects into
clusters, the cluster algorithm. One important set of clus-
tering algorithms are agglomerative hierarchical cluster
algorithms. Performing such analyses on a set of N time-
series results in an indexed hierarchy, where each level of
clustering is covered, beginning from N clusters of one
object each, and progressing until all the objects are in
one cluster containing N objects. The index details the
distance at which two clusters are merged.
A frequently used measure of the similarity of two
timeseries is their correlation,
ρij =
E(Xi − E(Xi))(Xj − E(Xj))√
Var(Xi)Var(Xj)
, (1)
which is often estimated by Pearson’s product-moment
correlation coefficient
ρˆij =
∑
k(Xik − X¯i)(Xjk − X¯j)√∑
k (Xik − X¯i)
2
∑
l (Xjl − X¯j)
2
, (2)
where X¯i is the sample mean for Xi and similarly for
X¯j and Xj. For a set of N timeseries, one can form a
correlation matrix C, whose elements are Cij = ρˆij .
In Ref. [4], Mantegna proposed using Minimum Span-
ning Trees (MST) as a clustering procedure to identify
hierarchical structure in financial markets. The pro-
cedure proposed was to transform the matrix C into
a distance matrix, D, where the elements of D are
dij =
√
2(1− ρˆij). This distance matrix can be thought
of as the adjacency matrix of a fully-connected, weighted
N -graph, from which it is simple to construct the MST.
Two algorithms commonly used to construct the MST
are Kruskal’s algorithm [5] and Prim’s algorithm [6]. The
MST has an indexed hierarchy associated with it, and it
was this hierarchy that Mantegna suggested as a tool for
defining a taxonomy of financial assets.
The dissimilarity measure chosen by Mantegna of
dij =
√
2(1− ρˆij) is approximately the Standardized Eu-
clidean distance between the timeseries i and j [7, 8].
Since there is evidence that the choice of dissimilarity
measure has less effect on the clustering than the choice
of clustering algorithm [9], we continue to use this mea-
sure for comparison with previous work; however, we note
that for the MST any co-monotonic transformation of
distances would give the same cluster structure [8, 10].
The first attempt to produce a hierarchy of financial
securities was in Ref. [11]; however, such techniques re-
ceived little attention until Mantegna’s paper [4]. Since
then, there has been an explosion of papers in the area
from the field of econophysics [3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. The MST clustering algorithm has
been applied to interest rate markets [22, 24], equity mar-
ket indices [20] and Foreign Exchange (FX) markets [3].
In Ref. [25], the MST procedure was extended to include
other links so that it was no longer a tree, but was the
graph with the maximum amount of information which
could be embedded in a surface. The graph which can be
embedded in the surface of a sphere was termed the Pla-
nar Maximally Filtered Graph (PMFG). However, the
hierarchical structure of this PMFG is identical to that
of the MST and, as such, the procedure would not be
of use here. The use of both the MST and the PMFG
as tools for noise-undressing of correlation matrices has
been investigated in Ref. [23].
Using the MST as a clustering tool is the same pro-
cedure that statisticians refer to as the Single Linkage
Clustering Algorithm (SLCA) [26]. This is one of the
simplest hierarchical clustering algorithms, and has been
in use as a clustering algorithm since 1951 [27], although
the first algorithm for calculating the MST was published
in 1926 [28]. However, the simplicity of the algorithm
can sometimes be detrimental. When merging two clus-
ters, the SLCA/MST method chooses the shortest link
between the two clusters and then defines the distance
between all objects in the two different clusters to be this
smallest distance, before merging the two clusters into a
new one, indexed by this distance. As the algorithm pro-
gresses, particularly for large N , there is a tendency for
the method to link objects into chains, where the objects
at each end of the chain have little or nothing in common
with each other. For this reason it is usual to compare
the results from one clustering method with other clus-
tering methods. If several methods which group objects
3in very different ways agree on the cluster structure, then
one can be confident of the robustness of ones results.
One cluster algorithm which groups objects in a very
differrent way to the SLCA is the Complete Linkage Clus-
tering Algorithm (CLCA). Where the SLCA defines the
distance between two clusters as the minimum of the
pairwise distances between two objects, one in each clus-
ter, the CLCA defines the distance as the maximum pair-
wise distance. If two such radically different clustering
algorithms agree on the cluster structure, this is very
strong evidence of robustness. Whilst the SLCA groups
objects into chains, the CLCA tends to group objects
into compact groups, where unless all the objects in a
group are very close together, they will not form a clus-
ter until a very large distance. For this reason the SLCA
is often termed as being space-contracting and the CLCA
as space-dilating [8, 10].
An algorithm which groups objects in a more moderate
way is the Average Linkage Cluster Algorithm (ALCA).
In this algorithm, the distance between two clusters being
merged is the average of all the pairwise distances, one
object in each cluster.
If the three algorithms above agree on the cluster struc-
ture, this is very strong evidence of the robustness of the
structure being identified. In this paper, we use all three
to confirm the robustness of our results. In addition, we
use a further algorithm, Ward’s Algorithm, which clus-
ters objects by a minimizing variance procedure [29]. If
this method agrees with the three linkage methods, then
this provides extremely strong evidence of robustness.
All hierarchical cluster algorithms result in an indexed
hierarchy. The distances of the objects in the fully con-
nected N -graph reside in a Euclidean space, and so obey
the metric inequality: dij ≤ dik + dkj . However, the cor-
rect space in which to describe a hierarchy is an ultramet-
ric space [10, 30] in which the distances of objects under a
clustering algorithm, d∗ij , obey the stronger ultrametric
inequality: d∗ij ≤ max(d
∗
ik, d
∗
kj). It is these ultrametric
distances [31] which we use to define the clustering dis-
tance for a currency. We explain the definition of this
clustering distance with the schematic hierarchy shown
in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows a section of a hypothetical hierarchy
resulting from using a hierarchical clustering method on
the exchange rates from five currencies: A, B, C, D
and USD (i.e. U.S. Dollar). The clustering distance
for a currency is the minimum distance at which one
can partition the hierarchy and get all the base rates for
that currency in the same cluster. Let us consider what
the clustering distance is for USD for the case shown
in Figure 1. In this example, if one partitions the hi-
erarchy at 0.1, one has a cluster of (USD/A, USD/B),
one cluster of (USD/C) and one cluster of (USD/D),
so 0.1 is not the clustering distance. If one partitions
the hierarchy at 0.2, there are two clusters contain-
ing USD based exchange rates: (USD/A,USD/B) and
distance (axis not to scale)
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
USD/A USD/B C/A USD/C USD/D
FIG. 1: (Color online) A schematic section of a hierarchy to
illustrate the definition of the clustering distance for a cur-
rency. In this simple example, there are five currencies: A,
B, C, D and USD (i.e. U.S. Dollar). The clustering distance
for USD is 0.4, since one has to travel up the hierarchy to
a distance of 0.4 until all the USD-based exchange rates are
included in the same cluster.
(USD/C,USD/D), so 0.2 cannot be the clustering dis-
tance. Partitioning the hierarchy at 0.3 still results in
two clusters containing USD based exchange rates, one
cluster of (USD/A,USD/B,C/A) and another cluster of
(USD/C,USD/D). However, if one were to partition the
hierarchy at 0.4, there would be one cluster contain-
ing (USD/A,USD/B,C/A,USD/C,USD/D). All the USD
based exchange rates are in the same cluster—hence the
clustering distance for USD in this rather simplistic ex-
ample is 0.4. Note that as a result of the distance defini-
tion, a smaller distance corresponds to a stronger corre-
lation.
III. THE DATA
The data used for this paper was provided by HSBC
Bank. We use the last tick of each minute to form 1-
minute prices for all exchange rates between the following
currencies: Australian Dollar (AUD), Canadian Dollar
(CAD), Swiss Franc (CHF), Euro (EUR), British Pound
(GBP), Japanese Yen (JPY) and U.S. Dollar (USD) [32].
This gives rise to 42 timeseries, from which we then form
1-minute log returns.
When performing regressions or calculating correla-
tions, it is necessary to ensure that each timeseries in the
data is autocovariance stationary [33, 34]. To this end,
4Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests (of various orders)
[33, 35, 36] were performed on the returns. The null hy-
pothesis for this test is that the data is nonstationary.
However, when ADF tests were performed on the return
data, this null hypothesis is strongly rejected—evidence
that the returns are autocovariance stationary.
Missing values were deleted prior to calculating cor-
relations. To preserve the positive-definite property re-
quired of correlation matrices, if a timestep was deleted
from one exchange rate, that timestep was deleted from
all currency pairs under investigation.
IV. RESULTS
We now turn to discuss each one of our four case-
studies in detail. To investigate the dynamics of the clus-
tering distance in each case, we use a window of length
T=120 timesteps which we then move through the data
one timestep at a time. There are N=42 timeseries, so
T ≥ N , as required. For each window the clustering
distance for each currency was calculated, as described
above.
1. 11 September, 2001
The results for 11 September 2001, are shown in Fig-
ure 2. The equity markets closed as a result of the ter-
rorist attacks, but the Foreign Exchange (FX) markets
remained open thereby allowing us to investigate the ef-
fect of the unfolding news on global markets. Figure 2
shows the power of this technique, with the market im-
pact by currency clearly visible.
The first feature to note in Figure 2, is a contagion-
like effect whereby clustering gets successively transferred
between currencies. Prior to the first tower being hit at
8:46am, there is no significant clustering in any currency,
although the Euro seems to be slightly ‘in play’ [3]. As
soon as the first tower is hit at 8:46am, a small amount
of additional clustering is seen in the Euro.
Remarkably, the Swiss Franc then undergoes a dra-
matic clustering prior to the second tower being hit. In
other words, even though the second tower has not yet
been hit – and hence the hitting of the first tower can
still be regarded as some form of awful accident – traders
have converged on the notion that something strange is
happening. As a result, the Swiss Franc comes into play,
taking centre stage in trading and hence giving rise to a
very small clustering level as shown in Figure 2. At the
same time, there seems to be a small split in opinion in
that the Japanese Yen is very slightly in play as well. As
soon as the second tower is hit, and people therefore real-
ize that this is more than just two very unlikely accidents,
the Swiss Franc undergoes another dramatic reduction in
clustering level. In essence, activity in the Swiss Franc is
then driving the market.
Just as remarkable is the absence of any additional
clustering features associated with the subsequent at-
tacks, i.e. the Pentagon at 9:37am and the crash in Penn-
sylvania at 10:03am. It is as though the market had al-
ready decided that the news is as bad as it can get. Hence
these two otherwise extremely dramatic events – which
on any other day would surely have driven the market
into mayhem – then had no visible effect. It is as if they
hadn’t happened.
It is interesting that it is the Swiss Franc (CHF) which
is the clustered currency in Figure 2 and not the U.S.
Dollar (USD). One might think that the reason is trivial
– CHF may be acting as a ‘safe haven’ currency which
people buy in order to try to protect themselves in uncer-
tain times. However, a quick look at the actual returns
shows that this cannot be the complete answer. In partic-
ular, Figure 3 shows the returns from a one-hour window
for 11 September 2001. This one-hour period includes
the first three attacks. The top panel shows the returns
for the CHF-based exchange rates; the bottom panel the
USD-based exchange rate returns over the same period.
The horizontal time-axis is the same in both cases. It
can be seen that before the first attack, the market is
quiet. The first large return comes a short time after the
first plane hits the World Trade Center. In other words,
the market takes time to absorb the news, assimilate its
meaning and validity, interpret its importance, and hence
react to it by trading. It can be seen that the reactions of
the CHF exchange-rates are effectively synchronized, and
certainly more so than the USD exchange-rates. This is
an important feature, since there is obviously no invisible
hand or central controller coordinating such a collective
dynamic – and the fact that it is in the CHF-based rates
but not the USD-based ones, implies that there is indeed
a collective realization or ‘consciousness’ that trading in
CHF is the right thing to do.
Most importantly, it is not simply the case that people
are buying CHF and selling everything else. To a first
approximation, increased demand for CHF (i.e. increase
number of buy orders) will increase its exchange-rate
while reduced demand for CHF (i.e. increase number of
sell orders) will decrease it. We can see from Figure 3 that
there is a spontaneous synchronization of buy and sell de-
cisions which is occuring in oscillatory fashion – in other
words, synchronized oscillatory fluctuations emerge from
an otherwise uncoordinated system. For this reason, the
rationale that people are simply seeking to buy CHF can-
not be right. Instead, there appears to be a rich process
of collective change-of-mind. Although one needs to be
careful with such analogies, we believe that these dynam-
ics represent one of the first ever demonstrations that
a financial market comprising semi-autonomous traders,
can show a collective conscience and/or concensus, and
that this can then vary dynamically over time.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The clustering distances for September 11 2001.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The returns for 11 September 2001,
over a period of time which includes the first three attacks.
Top panel: returns from the CHF-based exchange rates. Bot-
tom panel: returns from the USD-based exchange rates.
Even though this period of CHF-based synchroniza-
tion is not long, the magnitude of the returns has a large
effect on the correlation—hence the drop seen in the clus-
tering distance. To illustrate precisely how clustered the
CHF based exchange rates are at that time, Figure 4
shows the hierarchy resulting from using the SLCA on
a 120 timestep window of data ending at 9:05 EST on
11 September 2001. The CHF cluster is picked out in
red [37]. It is evident that all the CHF based rates are
clustered together. The clustering distance of 0.4532 cor-
responds to a correlation of 0.897.
2. CNY Revaluation — Rumour
The 11 September analysis above shows that the SLCA
clustering distance can identify a currency dominating
a group of others in the market, even for 1-minute re-
turns. In this section we consider a more market-specific
shock. At 08:23 GMT, Wednesday 11 May 2005, a ru-
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The hierarchy resulting from using
the SLCA on a 120 timestep window ending at 9:05 EST on
September 11 2001.
6mour began to propagate through the market that the
Chinese government would imminently remove the peg
between the Chinese currency (the Chinese Yuan Ren-
minbi, CNY) and the USD [38]. It turned out that the
rumour was false, but this was not known at the time.
The credibility of the rumour, and hence its contagion
period, survived for approximately 30 minutes. Toward
the end of this period, it gradually became evident to
most traders that the rumour was untrue.
This example is of particular interest for two reasons.
First, the shock is specific to the FX market, yet exter-
nal to the currencies included in our analysis. Hence it
does not represent news which is unambiguously ‘good’
or ‘bad’ for a given currency – nor are the subsequent
actions which a trader should take immediately obvious.
Second, the real revaluation of the CNY happened only a
couple of months later. Hence it is almost as if the same
shock happened twice. Comparing the difference between
the reaction of the market in both situations, therefore
enables us to interpret how the market processes such
information and to discover if the market ‘learns’ in any
way. In other words, does the FX market collectively
go ahead and repeat its earlier behavior or do something
completely different? A physical system would, in the
absence of hysteresis effects, respond in a similar way
if subject to similar conditions – but it is not obvious
whether human-based complex systems behave in such a
way. This study therefore provides a remarkably unique
experiment in a real-world system.
Prior to the rumour, the market was actually expect-
ing some form of official announcement about revaluing
the CNY in the ensuing days, weeks or months. In other
words, the market was ‘susceptible’ to such a rumour.
The Chinese government had been under pressure for
some time to revalue its currency, which other countries
felt was fixed at an unrealistically low price. However, the
knock-on effects of such a revaluation were not known be-
forehand. Some assumed that the announcement would
have a large impact on other Asian currencies. Others
argued that since the news had been expected for some
time, all possible effects on the Asian currencies would
have already been priced into the market.
Figure 5 shows the clustering levels for the day before,
and the day of, this false rumour (10–11 May 2005). It
is evident that there is a strong dip in the clustering dis-
tance for JPY. There are two important points to note.
First, the effect is seen in the JPY cluster level from the
very first window which incorporates the first minute of
the rumour. In other words, the market collectively con-
verged to a concensus concerning which currency should
be traded – despite the fact that there was no invisi-
ble hand or central controller to conduct the coordina-
tion process. Second, the observed clustering lasts for
approximately 30 minutes longer than the width of one
window, indicating that strong clustering is seen for the
entire time that the rumour is prevalent in the market.
Note that for such a strong clustering effect to be seen
as soon as the window includes the first timestep from
the rumour, the returns must be very large in order to
induce such a rapid change in the correlation.
Figure 6 shows the returns for the JPY-based exchange
rates for the period of time which includes the false CNY
revaluation rumour. The degree of synchronization be-
tween the different rates once the rumour emerges, is re-
markably strong – even more so than for 11 September.
The buying and selling of JPY is dominating any activity
in the rest of the currencies included in the analysis.
3. CNY Revaluation — Actual Event
Figure 7 shows the clustering distance for the day be-
fore, and the day of, the real CNY revaluation (20–21
July 2005). The similarities with Figure 5 for the ru-
mour, are striking. The market appears to be noisier
before the release of the news, which is probably a result
of some failed tube bombings in London earlier that same
morning. However, the clustering level seen in the JPY
is very similar in both the rumour and the real revalua-
tion. Again, the clustering is seen to last for longer than
one window length, indicating genuine clustering and not
simply one large outlying point. There is also some ev-
idence that the FX market has collectively ‘learnt’ from
the case of the rumour, or equivalently that it has some
kind of ‘memory’ of what happened before: in particu-
lar, Figure 5 shows that the clustering distance for JPY
returns to its original level once the rumour becomes dis-
credited, whereas Figure 7 shows that the clustering dis-
tance for JPY remains lower for a long time afterwards.
In other words, similar patterns are observed for the ru-
mour and real cases, but the real case evolves to a mod-
ified state.
Figure 8 shows the JPY-based exchange rate returns
for the time period which includes the real CNY revalu-
ation. As with the false rumour, the extent to which the
JPY-based exchange rates become synchronized once the
news is released, is striking.
4. Surprising Economic News
Looking again at Figure 5, and in particular the be-
haviour later in the day of 11 May, there is a feature
which at first seems puzzling. There is a dip in the USD
cluster distance which lasts for a short time (it lies within
the interval 13:08 to 14:52). This can be understood more
easily by referring to Figure 9, in which we show the clus-
tering distance results from 11 May 2005 using the small-
est possible window size (T=N=42). The time marked
‘X’ is the last time for which the window includes the
return at 08:23 GMT. The clustering in JPY continues
beyond this time, implying that the JPY cluster is the
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The clustering distances for the day before, and the day of, the false rumour concerning CNY revaluation.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The JPY-based exchange rate returns
for the time including the false CNY revaluation rumour. In
the inset, jpyaud denotes the exchange rate between JPY and
AUD etc.
result of a systematic clustering of JPY-based exchange
rates. The time marked ‘Y’ is the last time for which
the window contains the result at 12:31 GMT (which is
where the USD clustering starts). It can be seen that
as soon as the window does not include the timestep at
12:31, there is no clustering. Hence the ‘clustering’ of
USD in this situation is simply caused by the behavior
at one timestep. But what is this behavior due to?
It turns out that at 12:30 GMT on 11 May 2005, the
Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce
made a very surprising announcement about the U.S.
Trade Balance. This caused a very rapid change in the
value of USD against all other currencies. The returns
for the USD-based exchange rates around the time of
the announcement are shown in Figure 10, showing that
between 12:30 and 12:31 GMT, the value of the USD
has fluctuated against all the other currencies shown in
the analysis [39]. The directional price change for all
these exchange rates occurred in less than one minute,
whereas it appears that the volatility of the exchange
rates is larger following the announcement. This is in
agreement with papers researching the impact of eco-
nomic announcements on financial markets [40].
V. ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
The results detailed above are all for the SLCA/MST
clustering method. As we mentioned, there are potential
problems with using this method if the data structure is
not appropriate. In this section we repeat the analysis
for three different clustering algorithms: ALCA, CLCA
and Ward. Note that the Ward algorithm is constrained
to use the Euclidean distances between timeseries, and
not the standardized Euclidean distance. Thus the dis-
tances seen in the Ward algorithm graphs are not the
same distances as in the other graphs.
Figure 11 shows the results for 11 September. The
top panel is the ALCA distance, the middle panel is the
CLCA distance and the bottom panel is the Ward dis-
tance. There are several points of interest in this figure.
First, the initial clustering of EUR, which then becomes
dominated by the CHF cluster, is evident in all three pan-
els. Second, the CLCA distances (middle panel) show
that prior to the attacks the cluster distance is consis-
tently close to 2.0 for many currencies, for most of the
time, corresponding to perfect anticorrelation and hence
dˆij = −1.0. In general this occurs for the returns of
two inverse exchange rates (for example USD/CHF and
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FIG. 8: (Color online) The JPY-based exchange rate returns
for the time period which includes the real CNY revaluation.
CHF/USD). For the cluster distance for a currency to
be 2.0 it means that by the time all the exchange rates
with that currency as the base are in the same cluster,
there are two inverse exchange rates in the cluster. It is
obvious that one cannot consider two inverse exchange
rates to move together, so this level of clustering must
be interpreted as zero level of clustering. This allows us
to distinguish real clustering from noise.
Figures 12 and 13 shows the equivalent figures for the
case of the false CNY revaluation rumour and the actual
revaluation respectively. Similar effects can be seen in
these figures also. It can be seen that the clustering ob-
served as a result of the news can be distinguished from
the case of zero clustering. In addition, it can be seen
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FIG. 9: (Color online) The clustering distances from using
the shortest possible window size (42 returns) for the day of
11 May 2005.
that the clustering levels from the CLCA and Ward algo-
rithms are quite noisy, but still show the same clustering
for JPY.
VI. TOWARD A TAXONOMY OF NEWS
One very practical outcome of this research, would be
to understand what types of news move markets and
in what types of ways. In particular, we would like to
classify news in terms of its different types of impact.
Based on the observed synchronization and oscillatory
ripple-like effects in Sec. IV, we can hope to develop
general shock-response and vulnerability indicators in re-
sponse to the different types of events which a particu-
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FIG. 10: (Color online) The returns for the USD-based ex-
change rates for a time period including the Trade Balance
news release on 12 May 2005.
lar news agency could report. We are still short of this
goal. Indeed we would need to expand the database of
case-studies quite considerably in order to pin down such
classifications. However if we allow ourselves to speculate
for a moment, guided by the four case-studies in Sec. IV
(and some subsequent studies which we have carried out
but which are not presented in the current paper), we
would suggest that news could be usefully classified as
belonging to one of the following possible ‘species’ [42]:
Species A: News that is (1) unexpected in terms of the
fact that it occurs at all, (2) surprising in the sense of
when it occurs, (3) is not related directly to markets, (4)
has never happened before, and (5) is true. The events
of 11 September fall into this category.
Species B: News that is (1) somewhat expected in terms
of the fact that it occurs at all, (2) surprising in the sense
of precisely when it occurs, (3) is not related directly to
markets, (4) has never happened before, and (5) is true.
It turns out that the 7/7 terrorists attacks in London,
fall into this category. The fact that the U.K. was a close
ally of the U.S. and had hence received terrorist threats
since the Iraq invasion, meant that such attacks might
have been expected at some stage.
Species C: News that is (1) somewhat expected in terms
of the fact that it occurs at all, (2) surprising in the sense
of precisely when it occurs, (3) is related directly to mar-
kets, (4) has never happened before, and (5) is untrue.
The CNY rumour falls into this category. Although such
a revaluation had been expected for a while, the timing
of any official announcement was completely unknown to
the markets in advance – hence such a rumour would
have initially seemed highly credible to traders.
Species D: News that is (1) somewhat expected in terms
of the fact that it occurs at all, (2) surprising in the
sense of precisely when it occurs, (3) is related directly
to markets, (4) has happened before, and (5) is true. The
real CNY revaluation falls into this category.
Our results to date suggest that markets tend to re-
spond in a remarkably similar way to particular species
of news. In the case of terrorist attacks, for example,
the global response to the London attacks represented a
much milder but similar response to the earlier U.S. at-
tacks. For the case of the rumour and real revaluation
of the CNY, a similar pattern of response was observed.
This would not be a surprise for a mechanical object such
as a spring-balance: a spring-balance will respond in the
same way if it is pushed down in the same way. For a
spring-balance this isn’t surprising, since nothing much
else is happening to it. But for this to happen in a mar-
ket, is extraordinary. Indeed it represents a significant
endorsement of the whole idea that a financial market
can be seen as a real entity – a Complex System in its
own right.
VII. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we have shown that the clustering dis-
tance is a useful tool for investigating the collective hu-
man response to news in the FX market. In particular
we have shown that there is a markedly different response
seen when the news is genuinely unexpected, as opposed
to a scheduled economic announcement that has a value
far from what was expected by the market. We believe
that this tool could eventually prove very useful for clas-
sifying news events.
We have also confirmed the robustness of the results
from the MST method applied to the FX data. This
is particularly useful since it justifies the use of the in-
tuitive graphical representation provided by the MST.
Indeed, the clustering distances from the MST are less
noisy than for the other methods investigated. Section
V illustrates the importance of comparing results with
alternative clustering methods, so as to be able to distin-
guish real clustering from noise.
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